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What is my thesis? It is not that radical experimentation by the state, rather than liberal 
democracy, is more in accord with the spirit and logic of Popper‘s ‗revolutionary‘ epistemology. It 
is the opposite criticism, that full anarchic libertarianism (individual liberty and the free market 
without any state interference) better fits Popper‘s epistemology and scientific method. 
 I think this thesis important because I accept Popper‘s epistemology and methodology, and I 
think that these are a useful part of the defense of libertarianism: the value of complete liberty is 
a bold conjecture that withstands criticism rather than a theory to be supported by any specific 
argument or set of arguments. And, in its turn, libertarianism is a useful part of the defense of 
Popper‘s epistemology and methodology: it illustrates their beneficial social applications. In one 
sense, Popper‘s picture of the best way to pursue truth is only a part of the more general picture 
of libertarianism. Popper advocates what can be called ‗intellectual libertarianism‘. I am here 
suggesting that his libertarianism should be extended to the realm of individual persons and 
businesses (as contractual organizations, but I do not mean to exclude other voluntary 
organizations). Popper writes that he seeks to put ‗the finishing touches to Kant‘s own critical 
philosophy‘ ([1963] 1978, 27). I seek to put the finishing touches to Popper‘s own social 
philosophy. 
 Let us briefly recapitulate Popper‘s scientific epistemology and methodology. As Hume showed, 
it is logically impossible to support a universal theory with evidence. All corroborating evidence, 
even if accurate, is an infinitely small proportion of what the theory predicts. But one counter-
example shows a universal theory to be false. Thus the only rational way to pursue truth is to 
conjecture without supporting evidence and then deliberately to seek refutation. The bolder the 
conjecture (compatible with background knowledge), the greater the chance of capturing more 
truth.1 A free scientific culture is more or less a libertarian anarchy: anyone can form a theory 
and test it, and the results can be accepted, further tested, rejected, or ignored by other individual 
scientists. Laypeople tend to hear mostly about theories on which there is a scientific consensus 
and so do not always perceive the diversity and competition in science. 
 There are similarities with the anarchic workings of individual liberty and the free market. 
Anyone can originate a practice or product. People have individually to choose to try such 
practices or buy such products. Social and individual practices are aimed at satisfaction. They 
increase immediate utility or at least are useful experimentation. A new product offered by the 
individual entrepreneur is analogous with the bold new theories of the individual scientist. 
Analogous with having scientific theories aimed at truth, consumer products are aimed to satisfy 
demand.2 
 By contrast, ‗liberal democracies‘ illiberally ban and mandate various practices and products in 
a way that tends not to happen in science (unless the state intervenes). Unlibertarian regulation 
of social and personal practices decreases immediate utility or useful experimentation. Such 
policies as state subsidies to failing businesses and import restrictions that ‗protect‘ domestic 
production are analogous with ad hoc defenses of a theory (here in the form of a product) instead 
of accepting the ‗falsification‘ that is the absence of consumer demand. 
 If the scientific community were run democratically, then it would be as great a disaster for 
the discovery of truth as democracy is a disaster for the promotion of liberty and welfare. Michael 
Polanyi (1951) shows the deleterious effects on science of greater state regulation. Full blown 
democracy could only be more severe for science. 
 Popper sees that the people ‗never rule themselves in any concrete, practical sense‘ ([1945] 
1977, 1: 125). His understanding of ‗democracy‘ is not rule by the people but rather a way of 
limiting bad rule, ultimately in order to preserve maximum equal ‗freedom‘ – or so he asserts. But 
from a libertarian viewpoint, liberal democracy is a practical contradiction (at least, to the extent 
that ‗liberal‘ means having respect for interpersonal liberty): the more liberty individuals have 
the less they can be ruled by ‗the people‘ (or anyone else). A liberal democracy is a sort of 
substitute for all-out civil war. The winning side imposes its rules on the others by force and the 
threat of force. The taxation and regulation of people who are not imposing on anyone are 
themselves forms of aggressive imposition rather than peaceful persuasion. Popper insists that 
‗any kind of freedom is clearly impossible unless it is guaranteed by the state‘ ([1945] 1977, 1: 
111). The possibility of competing private police and courts protecting persons and their property 
and of anarchic defense are beyond rational consideration for Popper.3 
 He writes that the question ‗―Who should rule?‖ … begs for an authoritarian answer‘ ([1963] 
1978, 25). Libertarians disagree. ‗Each should rule himself: a sovereign individual‘ is a coherent 
non-authoritarian answer. Popper prefers to ask, ‗How can we organise our political institutions 
so that bad or incompetent rulers … cannot do too much damage?‘ ([1963] 1978, 25). But this 
clearly does presuppose the necessity for political authority over subjects. The very possibility of 
individual sovereignty, rather than the ‗institutional control of the rulers‘, is also ‗thereby 
eliminated without ever having been raised‘ ([1945] 1977, 1: 126). And with libertarianism, 
analogously with Popper‘s defense of good democratic institutions, the institution of individual 
sovereignty would ipso facto be maximally spread for safety. 
 I am interested only in what I call ‗actually existing democracy‘ rather than some impossible 
ideal (just as people used to refer to ‗actually existing socialism‘ – meaning regimes calling 
themselves ‗socialist‘ – rather than some impossible ideal of socialism). I mention this because 
Popper often explicitly sees some unfortunate state of affairs but he fails to see that it is 
practically intrinsic to liberal democracy. In fact he goes so far as to assert that it is ‗quite wrong 
to blame democracy for the political shortcomings of a democratic state. We should rather blame 
ourselves, that is to say, the citizens of a democratic state‘ ([1945] 1977, 1: 127). For Popper, 
democracy itself is apparently put beyond rational criticism. He does argue explicitly against the 
free market and in favor of what he calls ‗protectionism‘, by the state, to defend freedom and 
welfare (for example, [1945] 1977, 1: 110–11). A comprehensive response to Popper would have to 
include a close analysis of such arguments. In this philosophical outline I shall have to refer the 
reader to the relevant social scientific literature for the evidence against such ‗protectionism‘.4 
 I shall now expand on and make slightly more precise the supposed similarities and 
dissimilarities in the following, somewhat schematic, list. I do not doubt that this list could be 
further extended, clarified, and elaborated. Points are grouped together with the same number for 
each (dis)similarity, for ease of comparison and criticism. 
 
 
CR.: Critical rationalism (Popper‘s epistemology and methodology). 
LL.: Liberty and laissez-faire (individual sovereignty and the free market). 
LD.: Liberal democracy (actually existing liberal democracies rather than some impossible 
ideal). 
 
CR.1. No one has the authority to establish whether a theory is true or to impose his theories on 
others. 
LL.1. No one has the authority to establish whether a product or practice is desirable or to 
impose his products or practices on others. 
LD.1. The state has the authority to establish and impose what it sees as desirable products and 
practices. 
 
CR.2. We can be optimistic about attaining truth via free competition among theories. 
LL.2. We can be optimistic about achieving welfare via free competition among products and 
practices. 
LD.2. Political intervention is due to pessimism about achieving welfare via free competition 
among products and practices. 
 
CR.3. Scientists perceive their individual problems. 
LL.3. Persons and businesses perceive their individual problems. 
LD.3. Governments claim to perceive collective problems for the 
country/nation/society/economy/public interest (all these almost invariably being 
euphemisms which disguise special interests). 
 
CR.4. Scientists specialize in problems, not subjects with conventional boundaries. 
LL.4. Persons and businesses specialize in their problems. 
LD.4. Politicians are generalists without specialist skills – except in sophistry. 
 
CR.5. Scientists seek interesting and substantial truths. 
LL.5. Persons and businesses seek valuable and substantial practices and products. 
LD.5. Politicians usually seek votes. 
 
CR.6. Scientists should conjecture as boldly as they can imagine. 
LL.6. Persons and businesses should conjecture as boldly as they can imagine. 
LD.6. Politicians must usually consider cautious, small policy variations (‗extremism‘ will lose 
more votes than it gains). 
 
CR.7. Paternalism or special interest cannot impose or restrict scientific conjecture and 
experimentation. 
LL.7. Paternalism or special interest cannot impose or restrict individual and business 
conjecture and experimentation. 
LD.7. Paternalism and special interest must impose or restrict individual and business 
conjecture and experimentation. 
 
CR.8. Error elimination is required: so seek falsification, not ad hoc defenses. 
LL.8. Error elimination is required: ‗falsification‘ is obvious in less satisfaction or lower profits; 
coerced subsidies are not possible. 
LD.8. Error is unclear to politicians, except in terms of lost votes. So they deny error and 
subsidize mistakes. 
 
CR.9. After error elimination there is a new scientific problem situation. 
LL.9. After error elimination there is a new personal or business problem situation. 
LD.9. No clear new problem situation emerges, except that politicians have to buy more votes 
from somewhere, somehow. 
 
CR.10. This requires a new scientific theory. 
LL.10. This requires new practices and products. 
LD.10. Politicians usually seek a short-term botch without a clear theory, hence testing is 
difficult.5 
 
CR.11. The general social picture is of peaceful, polycentric competition among scientists about 
theories. 
LL.11. The general social picture is of peaceful, polycentric competition among individuals and 
businesses about practices and products. 
LD.11. The general social picture is of politically imposed privilege, predation, persecution, and 
Procrustean rules. 
 
CR.12. This is against holistic (society-wide) experiments because it is impossible to understand 
and test with so many variables or with unique situations. 
LL.12. This ensures individualism in understanding and testing personal or business problems. 
LD.12. Politics is typically holistic about understanding and testing problems of ‗society‘ and ‗the 
economy‘.6 
 
CR.13. This is against the historicist theory that social sciences make long-term prophesies. 
LL.13. This views unique individuals and the market catallaxy as unpredictable in the long term. 
LD.13. Politicians often rely on historicist theories to defend both ‗inexorable‘ change and 
‗unshakeable‘ tradition. 
 
CR.14. This is against the historicist theory that universal (hence timeless) social scientific 
technology is impossible. 
LL.14. This view embraces universal social scientific technology, especially from 
microeconomics.7 




 Why does Popper not see that libertarianism is the better social application of his epistemology 
and methodology? I suggest three possible contributory factors: 1. Popper came to his political 
position from a socialist one and retained some sympathy for socialism. 2. He made no serious 
study of economics; he simply swallowed many popular anti-market prejudices.9 3. Popper thinks 
‗absolute freedom is impossible‘ ([1963] 1978, 345). Instead, following Kant, the ‗liberal principle 
demands that the limitations to the freedom of each … should be minimised and equalised as 
much as possible …‘ ([1963] 1978, 351). 
 As (3) is the philosophical factor, let us focus on that. It is probably Popper‘s anti-essentialism 
that has caused him to avoid any explicit formulation of a theory of liberty that can be applied. 
But if we say, as I do, that a free person is someone who is not being imposed on by others 
(withholding a benefit, defending oneself, and enforcing a contract, restitution, or retribution 
cannot really be imposing), then it is possible to have a group of people who are completely free 
with respect to each other. And by such a conception of freedom it follows that state interference 
with non-invasive activities will be an assault on freedom. 
 When Popper was writing The Open Society and its Enemies he was contrasting the workings 
of liberal democracies such as Britain and the United States with totalitarian regimes of the kind 
with which they were at war. He considered the book to be his war effort. By such a contrast, 
liberal democracies are certainly more conducive to individual freedom and welfare, and I do not 
intend to contradict the general thesis for which Popper was arguing. But even if I were to agree 
with Winston Churchill that (liberal) democracy is the worst form of government apart from any 
other, I should wish to add that private-property anarchy is not as bad as liberal democracy.10 
 Hegel‘s ‗principle of subjective freedom‘, that free speech allows people ‗an irrelevant 
opportunity to give vent to their feelings‘ (as Popper interprets Hegel), seems quite realistic from 
a libertarian position. Popper‘s view that this is ‗cynicism‘, that the ordinary man is substantially 
free because he can speak his mind about politics, is quite inadequate ([1945] 1977, 2: 310 n43, 2). 
The illusion that a liberal democracy constitutes a so-called free country is partially sustained by 
this trick, which Popper perpetuates instead of taking liberty seriously. 
 At the end of the addenda to The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper states that fallibilism 
‗can show us that the role of thought is to carry out revolutions by means of critical debates rather 
than by means of violence and warfare … This is why our Western civilisation is an essentially 
pluralistic one …‘ ([1945] 1977, 2: 396). But what is politics finally backed up by if not aggressive 
violence? And what could be more pluralistic than respecting individual sovereignty instead? And 
this liberal democracy does not do. 
 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1 It is this last point about bold conjecture that has been mistaken as a sanction for revolutionary state 
experimentation. But, as dry logic and bloody history shows, such state experimentation really replaces millions of 
individual experiments with one Procrustean one. 
2 A free science and a free society are different things, of course. I am sure it is possible to come up with some relevant 
disanalogies as well. I will not attempt to list all these and reply to them. This is partly because one has to stop 
somewhere, but more important is that I cannot think of any that seriously threaten the general thesis being defended 
here: full anarchic libertarianism fits Popper‘s epistemology and scientific method much better than liberal democracy 
does. I do not assert that the fit is perfect in every way. 
3 To name but three who have made out general cases that private provision of law and order is not only possible but far 
superior: Molinari 1977 (a translation of his 1849 essay); Rothbard [1970], [1973]; David Friedman [1973]. 
4 The publications of the Institute of Economic Affairs (UK) are a good place to start on protectionism. 
5 On this point see Robinson 1993, 11 ff. This work is a case study on state energy policy that touches on many of the 
points in this section. The conclusion is a succinct introduction to the economics of government failure. 
6 So-called piecemeal engineering (Popper‘s expression and suggestion) by the state is simply authoritarian rather than 
totalitarian. ‗Social planning‘ that is imposed by force has the objectionable character of a revolution even if it is writ 
small. Only genuinely peaceful persuasion along libertarian lines completely avoids the problems of state planning. 
7 Microeconomics is really just economics. Macroeconomics is mainly about unsound arguments for political 
intervention. One brief discussion of this is area is Simpson 1994. 
8 For instance, rent control and minimum wage legislation are policies that are bound to decrease welfare in the long 
term (though economic controversy on minimum wages has revived; see Lal 1995). Again, Popper often sees such 
things but fails to see that this is a practical inevitability in a vote-buying liberal democracy. 
                                                                                                                                                        
9 This is despite the fact that Hayek‘s pro-market views must have had some influence on him. Conjectures and 
Refutations is even dedicated to Hayek. 
10 Can the market itself be seen as a sophisticated and fair form of democracy (with money as a store of voting power, 
which is voted to one by others)? That cannot literally be true as there is no rule in the market, only voluntary co-
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